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LEADING A JUDGE TO WATER: IN SEARCH OF A 
MORE FULLY FORMED WASHINGTON PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE 
Ivan M. Stoner 
Abstract: Under the public trust doctrine, a state must hold certain types of natural 
resources, most particularly navigable waters and shorelands, in trust for the benefit of the 
public. For that reason, courts closely scrutinize state actions impacting these public trust 
resources. In Caminiti v. Boyle,1 the Washington State Supreme Court developed a test that 
addresses situations where the State transfers control of public trust resources to private 
parties. But no firm rule guides Washington courts where a state action impacts the public 
trust without an alienation. This Comment examines the review Washington courts have 
applied in such situations, and concludes that while certain core principles are extractable—
especially the principle that Washington courts’ role under the public trust doctrine does not 
end with enforcing the non-alienation rule established in Caminiti—Washington public trust 
law in this area remains vague. This Comment argues that reference to Wisconsin’s well-
developed doctrine would clarify and improve Washington’s public trust doctrine, and 
proposes an analytical framework inspired by that created in Wisconsin’s courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the froth that the public trust 
doctrine has generated among academics,2 the Washington judiciary has 
imposed it cautiously.3 Washington courts recognize that the doctrine 
                                                     
1. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987). 
2. See 1 DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:9 
(2009) (“[L]aw review articles on the public trust doctrine are legion.”); James L. Huffman, 
Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2007) (noting that the doctrine has been the subject of a “raging flood” of academic 
commentary). In his treatise on environmental law, Professor William Rodgers maintains a 
continually expanding footnote compiling notable public trust doctrine articles—the footnote now 
spans several pages and contains dozens of articles. 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.20, at 155 n.1 (1986 & Supp. 2009). 
3. See 23 TIMOTHY BUTLER & MATTHEW KING, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.92, at 356 (2d ed. 2007) (“Washington courts have not gone as far as some 
other states in defining the scope and reach of the public trust doctrine.”). Indeed, courts in 
Washington have unfailingly upheld legislation against public trust challenges. See, e.g., Biggers v. 
City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 169 P.3d 14 (2007) (four dissenters and Justice 
Chambers—thus a majority of justices—concluding that public trust doctrine imposed no restraint 
on ability of local governments to issue moratoria on shoreline building); Samson v. City of 
Bainbridge Island, 149 Wash. App. 33, 202 P.3d 334 (2009) (holding that city’s amendment to its 
shoreline master program prohibiting private dock construction within undeveloped harbor did not 
violate public trust doctrine); infra Parts II.B, III. 
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casts them as enforcers of a public trust in certain unique public 
resources in which the public has an “overriding interest”4—navigable 
waters and shorelands being the prototypical and historical examples5—
but how best to discharge this duty remains in some respects unsettled. 
A landmark public trust case, Caminiti v. Boyle,6 established that the 
State may not give up control of public trust lands unless it does so in 
such a way that the public interest in those lands—the jus publicum—is 
not substantially impaired.7 Caminiti did not, however, speak to 
situations where the trust is compromised while remaining under state 
control or even as a direct result of the State’s actions. 
This raises a question: What limits does Washington’s public trust 
doctrine impose on the State’s conduct when that conduct does not 
transfer control of public trust land to private parties, but still impacts 
the jus publicum? How, for example, should courts review state action 
when the State wishes to reclaim public mudflats in order to build a 
power plant? Or to fill a wetland in order to build a highway? This 
Comment examines how courts review such government action under 
the public trust doctrine, and suggests a path towards a more complete 
framework. In the interest of brevity, situations where state action 
impacts the jus publicum without transferring control to a private party 
will generally be referred to as “non-alienation cases.” 
Washington courts appear to recognize that their role as protectors of 
the public trust involves more than an application of the principles 
established in Caminiti v. Boyle. When evaluating non-alienation cases, 
courts in Washington usually do more than simply confirm that an 
alienation has not taken place.8 A careful reading of Washington courts’ 
treatment of non-alienation cases suggests certain principles that apply 
in such situations, but the cases are limited both in number and in depth. 
Wisconsin’s courts, on the other hand, have developed a five-factor 
analysis with which they evaluate non-alienation cases.9 The important 
public trust principles that sound faintly in Washington’s non-alienation 
                                                     
4. Samson, 149 Wash. App. at 58 n.8, 202 P.3d at 347 n.8; see also Orion Corp. v. State, 109 
Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987) (noting that public trust doctrine requires that the 
State maintain dominion over Washington’s public property held in trust for the people). 
5. See Rettkowski v. Dept. of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (1993) (“The 
public trust doctrine evolved out of the public necessity for access to navigable waters and 
shorelands.”). 
6. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987). 
7. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 994–95. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73–74 (Wis. 1957); infra Part IV. 
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jurisprudence are clearly enunciated in Wisconsin’s. This Comment 
argues that Washington’s courts should look to Wisconsin public trust 
law to distill their treatment of non-alienation cases into a coherent 
framework. Wisconsin’s approach addresses the special considerations 
required in non-alienation cases and reflects the principles articulated in 
Washington’s still-developing doctrine. 
Part I of this Comment introduces the public trust doctrine. Part II 
examines the doctrine’s development in Washington up to the seminal 
Caminiti v. Boyle decision, and closely considers Caminiti. Part III 
analyzes non-alienation cases since Caminiti. Part IV introduces 
Wisconsin’s well-developed public trust doctrine jurisprudence and 
covers Wisconsin courts’ response to the non-alienation case problem. 
Finally, Part V argues that in such situations, Washington judges should 
employ a factor analysis similar to that created by their colleagues in 
Wisconsin. 
I. MURKY WATERS; FERTILE GROUND 
Often vague and always diverse, public trust doctrine philosophies 
have developed throughout the United States into a host of different 
textures and levels of refinement. Washington courts therefore have 
plentiful, though not always crystal clear, examples to draw from when 
they evaluate Washington’s own public trust doctrine. This Part 
introduces the public trust doctrine, outlines its basic principles, and 
briefly addresses academic and judicial attitudes towards the doctrine.10 
Additionally, with the aim of giving the reader a sense of how 
refinements to Washington’s public trust law would fit into the larger 
national picture, this Part provides snapshots of several areas of public 
trust law that have developed differently from state to state. 
                                                     
10. A full review of public trust law in the United States is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
This introduction, however, provides important foundation. More comprehensive treatments are 
available. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 2, § 2:20, at 155–68; SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, 
§§ 4:9–:20. Histories of the doctrine can be found in Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–91 (1970), and 
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope 
of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989). 
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A. “It is a doctrine with both a radical potential and indifferent 
prospects”11 
Whether or not “black letter” law can be said to exist in a doctrine as 
malleable12 as the public trust doctrine is debatable, but some basic 
principles have been around long enough to grow barnacles. The 
doctrine is old enough to be considered classical,13 has a long history in 
the United States,14 and relates closely to the general rule that title to 
lands beneath a state’s internal tidal and navigable waters rests in that 
state.15 At the doctrine’s core are the ideas that the public has a powerful 
interest in lands beneath navigable and tidal waters,16 and that the state 
holds such lands in trust for the people.17 Recognizing this, courts have 
split ownership interests in public trust lands into two parts: private 
property interests (the jus privatum) and public interests (the jus 
publicum).18 
                                                     
11. RODGERS, supra note 2, § 2:20, at 155. 
12. See id. (terming the doctrine “resoundingly vague”). 
13. Scholarship on the public trust doctrine nearly always notes the doctrine’s roots in the codes 
of the Roman emperor Justinian. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property 
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 
631, 632 (1986) (“The public trust doctrine is based on an amorphous notion that has been with us 
since the days of Justinian—the notion that the public possesses inviolable rights in certain natural 
resources.”); Sax, supra note 10, at 475 & n.15; Ewa M. Davidson, Comment, Enjoys Long Walks 
on the Beach: Washington’s Public Trust Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage Over 
Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV. 813, 830–32 (2006). There has been criticism of the accuracy 
of that line of descent. See Huffman, supra note 2, at 12–19. Nonetheless, it has been commonly 
accepted by modern courts as a starting point when considering the doctrine. See Davidson, supra, 
at 830 (“The judiciaries of ten states, including Washington, recognize the Institutes [of Justinian] 
as an ancient codification of the public trust doctrine.” (footnote omitted)). 
14. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 284–86 (1997) (citing early public trust 
cases and commentary). 
15. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (looking to public trust cases to 
address extent of state title to lands washed by non-navigable tidewaters). In the original thirteen 
states, state ownership of submerged lands was acquired from England through revolution. Shively 
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1894). States later admitted to the Union acquired identical rights to 
submerged lands under the equal-footing doctrine. Phillips Petrol., 484 U.S. at 474 (quoting 
Shively, 152 U.S. at 57). 
16. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 285 (noting “the principle in American law recognizing the 
weighty public interests in submerged lands”); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 668–69, 732 
P.2d 989, 994 (1987). 
17. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
18. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 284 (quoting Shively, 152 U.S. at 13); see also MATTHEW 
HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM (n.d.), reprinted in STUART A. 
MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370, 389–90 (3d ed. 
1888) (“[T]he jus privatum, that is acquired by the subject either by patent or prescription, must not 
prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers or the arms of the sea are affected for public 
use.”). Lord Hale’s treatise, written in the late seventeenth century, was a starting point for the 
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The jus publicum has historically included public rights to use 
navigable waters for navigation, commerce, and fishing19—the so-called 
“traditional triad” of public trust rights.20 While a state may freely 
convey the jus privatum to private parties, such transfers are subject to 
an implied reservation of the jus publicum.21 The public trust doctrine 
thus preserves continuing public rights in public trust resources even in 
the face of apparent alienation by the State.22 
The seminal decision involving an alienation of public trust lands is 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1892 Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.23 
Commentators and courts have generally agreed that Illinois Central 
represents the prototypical situation that the public trust doctrine exists 
to prevent, where “a small, well-organized private interest procure[s] 
legislation that g[ives] it monopoly privileges in order to extract wealth 
from the diffuse and unrepresented public.”24 The case originated from 
the Illinois legislature’s decision to deed to a railroad more than 1000 
acres of the Chicago harbor—a property as large as “all the merchandise 
docks along the Thames at London.”25 When a later legislature moved to 
                                                     
earliest American public trust scholars. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of 
the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
799, 826–27 n.121 (2004). It was likewise relied upon in the first American public trust doctrine 
cases. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 74–76 (N.J. 1821). 
19. See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452. 
20. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983). 
21. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 458; see also Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 72 (stating that the sovereign cannot 
“intrude upon the common property . . . , the enjoyment of it is a natural right which cannot be 
infringed or taken away”). 
22. See, e.g., Arnold, 6 N.J.L. 1 (recognizing public right to gather oysters on New Jersey beaches 
even where pre-independence land grant had purported to convey oyster bed to private individual). 
23. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For a thorough history of Illinois Central and an assessment of its 
“lodestar” position in United States public trust doctrine law, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, 
at 853–87. State courts, including Washington’s, see infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text, 
have almost unfailingly used Illinois Central as the foundation for fleshing out their own public 
trust doctrines. See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1988) 
(“Illinois Central remains the leading case regarding public rights in tide and submerged lands 
conveyed by the state.”); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 
1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983) (“Illinois Central . . . is the seminal case on the scope of the public trust 
doctrine and remains the primary authority today.”); Shepard’s Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 44 
S.E. 39, 41–42 (N.C. 1903); see also West Indian Co. v. Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1018 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (citing Illinois Central as a generally understood common law rule of the United States). 
24. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, at 805; see also, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust 
Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 425 (1987) (noting that though there are difficulties in judging the 
adequacy of consideration, the city had probably been “ripped off” by the railroad). 
25. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 454. 
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undo the transfer, the railroad cried foul, and a suit resulted in which 
both parties asserted title.26 
The litigation worked its way to the Supreme Court, which rejected 
the railroad’s claim on the grounds that the State’s public trust 
responsibilities prevented it from transferring the land in the first place.27 
Justice Stephen Field, writing for the Court, declared that: 
[S]uch property is held by the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, 
in trust for the public. The ownership of the navigable waters of 
the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public 
concern to the whole people of the State. The trust with which 
they are held, therefore, is governmental, and cannot be 
alienated, except . . . when parcels can be disposed of without 
detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining.28 
The State’s transfer of the lands under the harbor of Chicago—a 
property “of immense value to the people of the State of Illinois”—was 
therefore necessarily revocable.29 Anything else would be “a gross 
perversion of the trust.”30 
The public trust doctrine, however, has never been limited to the 
bedrock tenets of Illinois Central. Rather, as a creature of the common 
law, the doctrine is capable of expansion to meet the public need.31 
Courts usually do not hesitate to entertain public trust claims even when 
no transfer of public land has occurred.32 Even in early cases, courts 
recognized that the public rights encompassed by the jus publicum may 
extend beyond the traditional triad33 and that the jus publicum’s scope 
                                                     
26. Id. at 439. 
27. Id. at 453 (“A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been 
adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if 
not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation.”). 
28. Id. at 455–56. 
29. Id. at 454. 
30. Id. at 455. 
31. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
32. See, e.g., Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984) 
(applying public trust doctrine to agency’s approval of hazardous waste facility); United Plainsmen 
Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461, 463 (N.D. 1976) (holding 
that public trust doctrine is not restricted to conveyances of real property and applying doctrine to 
water allocation decision); see also State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825, 827 (N.C. 1988) 
(“Under the public trust doctrine, each state could regulate or dispose of its tidal lands, provided 
that it could be done ‘without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters.’” 
(emphasis added)). 
33. See, e.g., Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909) (“[I]t 
would be too strict a doctrine to hold that the trust for the public . . . is for navigation alone. It is 
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may reach beyond tidal and navigable waters.34 The Vermont Supreme 
Court put it elegantly: 
[T]he public trust doctrine retains an undiminished vitality. The 
doctrine is not fixed or static, but one to be molded and extended 
to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was 
created to benefit. The very purposes of the trust have evolved in 
tandem with the changing public perception of the values and 
uses of waterways.35 
Accordingly, the doctrine manifests itself diversely throughout the 
nation, conforming to the changing public needs and judicial traditions 
of different states.36 
The public trust doctrine stands distinct from the various regulatory 
regimes37 that protect the public interest in waters and underlying lands 
in that the judiciary, rather than the legislature, largely created and 
developed it.38 This judicial scrutiny of legislative policy judgments39—
an arena in which great deference is normally granted40—has fascinated 
academics, giving rise to both ringing praise41 and spirited criticism.42 
                                                     
wider in its scope, and it includes all necessary and proper uses, in the interest of the public.”); see 
also infra notes 57–63 and accompanying text. 
34. See, e.g., Bohn v. Albertson, 238 P.2d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (extending public trust to 
lands flooded by the San Joaquin River); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 
2000) (extending public trust to groundwater). 
35. State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
36. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 
(2007) (reviewing the public trust doctrine in eastern states, and noting the “richness and complexity 
of [the various states’] public trust philosophies”); infra Part I.B. 
37. See, e.g., Water Resources Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.54.005–.920 (2008) 
(mandating that allocation of water between competing uses be based on securing maximum net 
benefits for the people of the state); Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 90.58.010–.920 (2008) (requiring that uses and developments proposed for Washington’s 
shorelines be consistent with statutory shoreline management policies and local shoreline 
management plans). 
38. Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in 
Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 524–25 (1992). 
39. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 698, 958 P.2d 273, 283 (1998) (“[C]ourts 
review legislation under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree of judicial 
scrutiny . . . .”). 
40. State v. Heiskell, 129 Wash. 2d 113, 122, 916 P.2d 366, 370 (1996) (“Ultimately, it is not this 
Court’s function to question the wisdom of a[] [legislative] enactment, unless a constitutional 
impediment is present. We will not inquire into the policies underlying a clear legislative 
enactment.”). 
41. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 38, at 594, 596 (calling the doctrine “a powerful tool to protect 
the public interest in tidelands and shorelands” that “provides important protection for coastal 
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Professor Joseph Sax’s call to use the doctrine as a tool for protection of 
natural resources43 has been particularly influential,44 and over the last 
forty years a few state courts have taken the doctrine in a decidedly 
“environmentalist” direction.45 More commonly, however, the 
environmental aspect of the doctrine has met with tepid judicial 
response, and by and large no great revolution has occurred to match 
Professor Sax’s vision.46 
                                                     
resources from harmful private development”); Sax, supra note 10, at 509, 560 (arguing that the 
doctrine is a “medium for democratization” that protects a “disorganized and diffuse majority” from 
the “self-interested and powerful minorities” that “often have an undue influence on the public 
resource decisions of legislative and administrative bodies and cause those bodies to ignore broadly 
based public interests”). 
42. William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional 
Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 385, 404 (1997) (“[T]he [public trust] doctrine has been criticized as a backward-
looking, antidemocratic vestige whose time, if it ever existed, has passed.”); see, e.g., James L. 
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 
ENVTL. L. 527, 533 (1989) (“By misconceiving the doctrine [as consisting of more than a simple 
easement], our modern courts have confused the concepts of public rights, police power, and 
constitutional rights. As a consequence, the courts have threatened basic values of constitutional 
democracy and individual liberty.”); Lazarus, supra note 13, at 658 (“[T]he public trust 
doctrine . . . is now, at best, superfluous and, at worst, distracting and theoretically inconsistent with 
new notions of property and sovereignty . . . .”). 
43. Sax, supra note 10, at 474 (“Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust 
doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a tool of 
general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource 
management problems.” (footnote omitted)); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine 
from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 188 (1980) (“The central ideal of the 
public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but 
without formal recognition such as title.”). 
44. See Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,114, 10,125 (2008) (noting the increasing use of the public 
trust doctrine since the 1970s and Professor Sax’s status as the “catalyst” for this revival); Carol M. 
Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 352 (1998) (crediting 
Professor Sax with “usher[ing] in” the modern revival of the public trust concept). 
45. Both the California and Hawaii supreme courts have handed down prominent public trust 
doctrine decisions in which they cited Professor Sax’s work and held that the doctrine demands 
affirmative state action to preserve the environment. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 
658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (expressly applying the public trust doctrine to limit stream 
diversions that were harming the environment); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 
455 (Haw. 2000) (holding that public trust doctrine requires the State to consider cumulative impact 
of water use allocations on the trust, and to implement reasonable mitigation measures, including 
the use of alternative sources). 
46. See J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of “The Fragile Land System,” 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2005, at 5–6, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/ 
profiles/ruhl/2005-FragileLandSystem20NREFall.pdf (noting that the public trust doctrine has not 
been widely embraced by state courts as a vehicle for judicial intervention in natural resource 
management policy); James L. Wescoat, Jr., Submerged Landscapes: The Public Trust in Urban 
Environmental Design, from Chicago to Karachi and Back Again, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 435, 461 
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In sum, whatever the controversies surrounding its content, scope, and 
theoretical underpinnings, the public trust doctrine is a firmly established 
part of the common law.47 The doctrine generally protects water-based 
activities on water resources, but is capable of being extended farther. It 
invites active use by environment-focused lawyers, but, being often 
“buried in the deeper recesses of the complaint,”48 the doctrine has been 
more readily embraced by academics than courts. It certainly exists 
throughout the United States, but its contours—even within a particular 
jurisdiction—are often hard to define. 
B. United States Courts Take Diverse Approaches to the Jus Publicum 
The boundary of the public trust has often been linked to the wash of 
the tide,49 but depending on which court’s decision applies, the landward 
limit of the jus publicum may be the low water mark,50 the high water 
mark,51 the vegetation line,52 or even the reach of the waves in winter.53 
Other jurisdictions have expanded the trust beyond the sea to all surface 
waters,54 to groundwater,55 and to non-water resources.56 Suffice it to say 
the public trust doctrine’s scope and application can vary dramatically 
                                                     
(2009) (“While it is an exaggeration to say that law review articles on the public trust doctrine are 
almost as numerous as the number of decisions that cite Illinois Central, the number of public trust 
cases has not been as large as hoped or feared by various commentators.”). 
47. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 669, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987). The notion that federal 
law imposes a minimum or “floor” public trust doctrine on the states has been advanced by several 
commentators. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 36, at 4–5 (characterizing the public trust doctrine 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central as the “default minimum standard 
for the states”); Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 459 (arguing that the public trust doctrine stems from 
the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause and becomes binding on new states at statehood). 
48. RODGERS, supra note 2, § 2.20, at 155. 
49. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894) (“At common law, the title and the 
dominion in lands flowed by the tide were in the King for the benefit of the nation.”); see also City 
of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 364–66 (Cal. 1980) (recounting history of public 
rights in California tidelands). 
50. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1099–100 (Mass. 1981) (“. . . or 100 
rods from mean high water, if lesser.”). 
51. Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 607–08 (N.H. 1994). 
52. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 & n.1 (N.J. 1984) (“. . . or 
where there is no vegetation[,] to a seawall, road, parking lot or boardwalk.”). 
53. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 773–74, 776 (Haw. 1977). 
54. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that 
Montana’s public trust doctrine extends to “any surface waters that are capable of recreational use”). 
55. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445–47 (Haw. 2000) (“[T]he 
public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or distinction.”). 
56. See, e.g., Parsons v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 920, 926–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (extending public 
trust protections to public park). 
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from state to state. The following is a representative tour designed to 
give a sense of courts’ differing treatments of the public trust doctrine 
throughout the United States. 
It is common for states’ public trust doctrines to differ in the range of 
public activities protected. For instance, Mississippi has an expansive 
list of purposes to which public trust lands may be put, including 
navigation, transportation, commerce, fishing, bathing, swimming, other 
recreational activities, development of mineral resources, environmental 
protection, enhancement of marine life, sea agriculture, and “no doubt 
others.”57 Alaska, on the other hand, has maintained a narrow scope, 
limiting its doctrine to the three traditional uses of navigation, 
commerce, and fishing.58 Scientific study is a public trust use in 
California,59 as is hunting in Wisconsin.60 New Jersey’s courts protect 
the right to travel over private lands to access public trust areas,61 but 
Arkansas’ courts do not.62 The Supreme Court of Iowa has situated itself 
between these two extremes, holding that the public’s right to access 
trust lands is protected only to the extent that the State can prove at least 
some ownership interest in the land that would provide access.63 
The extent to which a state has an affirmative duty to preserve public 
trust lands and waters also varies widely. Hawaii’s public trust doctrine 
is directly based on language in its constitution64 and imposes powerful, 
substantive checks on the State’s regulation of water use.65 In contrast, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the public trust doctrine 
provides only a presumption that where the legislature conveys public 
trust land, it does not do so “in a manner that would impair public trust 
                                                     
57. Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), aff’d 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
58. See City of Saint Paul v. State, 137 P.3d 261, 263 n.8 (Alaska 2006). 
59. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
60. R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 787–88 (Wis. 2001). 
61. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (“[W]here use of 
dry sand is essential or reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the ocean, the doctrine warrants the 
public’s use of the upland dry sand area subject to an accommodation of the interests of the 
owner.”). 
62. State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Ark. 1980) (“It is not disputed that riparian 
landowners on a navigable stream have a right to prohibit the public from crossing their property to 
reach such a stream.”). 
63. See Larman v. State, 552 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996). 
64. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“The State has an obligation to protect, control and regulate 
the use of Hawaii’s water resources for the benefit of its people.”). 
65. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 504–05 (Haw. 2000) (holding that the 
public trust imposes a fiduciary duty on the State to “actively and affirmatively protect, control and 
regulate” water resources). 
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rights.”66 In that state, the legislature can overcome this presumption—
and consequently extinguish all public rights in the property—by clearly 
indicating that it wishes to convey a parcel without reservation of any 
public trust rights.67 
More specifically pertinent to this Comment are the standards under 
which courts review legislative action under the public trust doctrine. In 
Idaho, courts take a “close look” at a State action to determine whether it 
complies with the public trust doctrine.68 In Alaska, grants of exclusive 
rights to harvest natural resources are subject to “close scrutiny.”69 
Maine’s courts review legislative restraints on public trust rights for a 
rational basis,70 but look for a “particularly demanding standard of 
reasonableness” when they assess that rationality.71 Courts are 
sometimes remarkably unclear as to the level of scrutiny they apply.72 
Washington’s standard of review is discussed below in Parts II and III. 
As this section has shown, the national setting in which Washington 
courts must determine the ambit of the Washington public trust doctrine 
is decidedly piebald. It is not without good reason that the doctrine has 
been described as “not easily researchable” with “few experts” and “not 
many more who claim to be experts.”73 This variety also shows, 
however, that when Washington courts are called upon to develop, 
refine, or clarify the public trust doctrine, they are the beneficiaries of a 
rich field of different approaches and philosophies. 
                                                     
66. Gwathmey v. State, 464 S.E.2d 674, 684 (N.C. 1995) (holding that because there is no 
constitutional basis for the public trust doctrine in North Carolina, the doctrine only serves as a rule 
of statutory construction, and will not invalidate express legislative acts). 
67. See id. In Washington, however, it appears that even express legislation cannot abrogate the 
trust, and that the legislature can never relinquish the trust by a transfer of property. See Orion Corp. 
v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987). 
68. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho 
1983). 
69. Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 494 (Alaska 1988) (referring specifically to natural 
resources listed in the Alaska Constitution’s common use clause). 
70. See State v. Haskell, 955 A.2d 737, 740 (Me. 2008). 
71. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 1981). 
72. See Brian E. Gray, The Uncertain Future of Water Rights in California: Reflections on the 
Governor’s Commission Report, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 43, 60–61 & n.114 (2005) (asserting that 
in National Audubon Society, the California Supreme Court identified no less than five different 
standards of review, including “a feasibility criterion, a public interest test, a rough form of cost-
benefit analysis, a balancing approach, and a purely ‘considerational’ requirement analogous to a 
[National Environmental Policy Act] or [California Environmental Quality Act] analysis of 
reasonable alternatives”). 
73. RODGERS, supra note 2, § 2.20, at 155–56. 
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II. WASHINGTON’S EARLY CASES CULMINATED IN A TEST 
THAT ADDRESSES TRUST ALIENATIONS 
As in other states, the public trust doctrine has existed in Washington 
common law since statehood, though it has evolved considerably from 
its late nineteenth-century beginnings.74 Early cases, decided when 
Washington was a resource-rich frontier state, concerned themselves 
mainly with the efficient development of Washington’s natural 
resources.75 Later cases expanded the doctrine,76 and it currently 
includes at a minimum public rights to navigate, engage in commercial 
activity, fish, boat, swim, and water ski,77 as well as an interest in 
clamming on public78 (but not on private)79 land. 
The standard by which Washington courts review legislative action 
under the public trust doctrine has likewise evolved. Before 1987’s 
Caminiti v. Boyle, the extent of this review was largely uncertain. 
Caminiti ushered in Washington’s modern public trust era by developing 
a test that enables courts to respond to alleged alienations of public trust 
lands. This Part traces the development of the public trust doctrine in 
Washington up to and including Caminiti, focusing on the manner and 
degree to which courts review legislative action. 
                                                     
74. See Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 669, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987). For an account of 
the public trust doctrine’s role and history in Washington by a leading Washington public trust law 
scholar, and a still-valuable discussion of the doctrine’s potential future in this state, see Professor 
Ralph Johnson’s 1992 article, supra note 38. A compilation of Professor Johnson’s published work 
(including his many articles and symposia on public trust law) is available online through the 
University of Washington’s Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library. Cheryl Nyberg, Ralph Johnson: 
1923–1999 (2001), http://lib.law.washington.edu/ref/raljohnson.html. 
75. See State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 171, 135 P. 1035, 1040 (1913) (“The state has invited 
investment in [public trust] lands upon the theory that, in private ownership, all land lying back of 
the inner harbor line or the line of ordinary navigability would be reclaimed and put to useful 
purposes.”). 
76. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640–41, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (“Recognizing 
modern science’s ability to identify the public need, state courts have extended the doctrine beyond 
its navigational aspects.”). 
77. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 669, 732 P.2d at 994 (quoting Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 
306, 316, 462 P.2d 232, 239 (1969)). According to the Caminiti Court, jus publicum activities also 
include “other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to the right of 
navigation and the use of public waters.” Id. 
78. Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash. App. 
441, 451, 101 P.3d 891, 896 (2004). 
79. State v. Longshore, 141 Wash. 2d 414, 428, 5 P.3d 1256, 1263 (2000). 
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A. Dicta in Washington State’s Early Public Trust Doctrine Cases Are 
Inconsistent Regarding the Extent to Which the Doctrine Limits 
State Action 
An examination of Washington’s early public trust doctrine 
jurisprudence reveals no consistent approach with respect to the 
doctrine’s limits on state action. The first case to deal with public trust 
concerns in Washington was Eisenbach v. Hatfield,80 in which a 
landowner sued to stop construction of structures on privately owned 
tidal land seaward of his property.81 The Washington State Supreme 
Court held that the landowner could not, as a riparian owner, stop state 
action in the navigable waters adjoining his estate.82 Though it ruled 
against the landowner, the Eisenbach Court noted the distinction 
between the jus privatum, which might be conveyed to individuals, and 
the “public right of navigation and fishing,” which could not.83 
Eisenbach was not alone among early Washington decisions in 
recognizing the concept of the jus publicum. The state supreme court 
noted in State v. Sturtevant84 that the State held the right of navigation 
“in trust for the whole people” of Washington.85 Later, in Hill v. 
Newell,86 the Court quoted language from a then-leading California 
public trust doctrine case that went even further, to the effect that any 
state interest in public trust land was “subservient” to public rights in the 
jus publicum, and that the State was incapable of disposing of public 
trust lands in a manner prejudicial to those rights.87 Other early courts 
expressed similar sentiments, with varying degrees of forcefulness.88 
Occasional suggestions that the judiciary has no role in enforcing 
what form the state trusteeship should take, however, offset this early 
                                                     
80. 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891). 
81. Id. at 237, 26 P. at 539. 
82. Id. at 253, 26 P. at 543–44. 
83. Id. at 240–41, 26 P. at 539–40. 
84. 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913). 
85. Id. at 165, 135 P. at 1037. 
86. 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915). 
87. Id. at 231, 149 P. at 952 (quoting People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 82 (1913), and noting 
that that court’s language was “in effect the holding of this court”). 
88. See, e.g., City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 499, 64 P. 735, 737 
(1901) (noting paramount public right in use of navigable waters that sovereign could neither 
destroy nor abridge), quoted with approval in Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 
Wash. 414, 419, 82 P. 718, 720 (1905); cf. Hulet v. Wishkah Boom Co., 54 Wash. 510, 517, 103 P. 
814, 816 (1909) (noting public right to navigate, and holding that that right could not be 
“unnecessarily interfer[ed]” with by a private party). 
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language. The Eisenbach Court indicated that it could not “deny the 
power of the state to deal with its own property as it may deem best for 
the public good.”89 Further, well into the twentieth century, Washington 
courts accepted without objection state policies that would result in the 
destruction of public trust lands.90 Certainly no early court invoked the 
public trust doctrine in order to restrict state action with regard to the jus 
publicum. 
In sum, early public trust cases in Washington contain interesting 
dicta, but fail to yield a consistent theory about the extent to which state 
action is reviewable under the public trust doctrine. Unambiguous 
recognition of public trust constraints on state action would not emerge 
until the Supreme Court of Washington accepted Benella Caminiti’s 
petition for review in 1987. 
B. Caminiti v. Boyle: The Beginning of Washington’s Modern Public 
Trust Doctrine 
In Caminiti v. Boyle, the Washington State Supreme Court explicitly 
considered a challenge to state action under the public trust doctrine for 
the first time.91 Caminiti involved a challenge to a state statute that 
allowed owners of waterfront property to build recreational docks 
without payment to the State.92 The petitioners argued that the statute 
effectively relinquished state control over public trust resources, and that 
those resources would be gobbled up by uncontrolled proliferation of 
private docks.93 While the petitioners lost on the merits, they succeeded 
in persuading the Court to affirmatively recognize a Washington public 
trust doctrine,94 and since then Justice James Andersen’s opinion for the 
                                                     
89. Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 253, 26 P. 539, 544 (1891), quoted in Grays Harbor 
Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 90, 102 P. 1041, 1044 (1909). The Eisenbach Court also 
noted that the states succeeded to the British Parliament’s “absolute control” over public trust rights. 
Id. at 240–41, 26 P. at 539–40; see also Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127, 131–32, 
94 P. 922, 923 (1908) (“[T]he state has full power to dispose of [tide lands], subject to no 
restrictions save those imposed upon the Legislature by the Constitution of the state and the 
Constitution of the United States.”); cf. Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 275, 75 P. 807, 809 
(1904) (“It is no doubt true that the sovereign authority may control and regulate the use of 
navigable waters . . . .”). 
90. See, e.g., Harris v. Hylebos Indus., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 770, 786, 505 P.2d 457, 466 (1973) 
(“The legislative intent regarding the use of tidelands in harbors of cities is manifestly that . . . the 
filling and reclaiming of the tidelands which have been sold to private parties shall be 
encouraged.”). 
91. Johnson, supra note 38, at 535. 
92. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 663, 732 P.2d 989, 991 (1987). 
93. See id. at 671, 732 P.2d at 995. 
94. Id. at 669–70, 732 P.2d at 994. 
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eight-justice majority has been the foundation for Washington’s 
doctrine. 
After reaffirming its earlier holdings that the State of Washington has 
the power to transfer the jus privatum in tidelands and shorelands,95 the 
Court turned to the jus publicum and set about formulating 
Washington’s legal standard for public trust alienation claims. In doing 
so, the Court relied heavily on language from the United States Supreme 
Court’s Illinois Central decision, which also involved a state giving up 
control of public trust resources.96 The Caminiti Court adopted the 
principles from Illinois Central: The State can no more give away the jus 
publicum interest in public trust land than it can give away its police 
powers, and regardless of who holds title to public trust land, 
sovereignty and dominion over such land always remain with the State.97 
Further, the Washington State Supreme Court looked to Illinois 
Central to formulate a test that would identify state violations of the 
public trust doctrine. From Justice Field’s wall of nineteenth-century 
prose, Justice Andersen plucked the following articulation of the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding:98 
The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never 
be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the 
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and 
waters remaining.99 
Working from this passage, the Caminiti Court declared that when a 
violation of the doctrine is alleged, Washington courts must inquire: 
(1) [W]hether the State, by the questioned legislation, has given 
up its right of control over the jus publicum and (2) if so, 
whether by so doing the State (a) has promoted the interests of 
the public in the jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially 
impaired it.100 
Applying the first prong of the new test, the Caminiti Court noted that 
by enacting the law allowing private dock construction, the Legislature 
                                                     
95. Id. at 666–67, 732 P.2d at 993. 
96. Id. at 669–70, 732 P.2d at 994–95; see supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text. 
97. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 669, 732 P.2d at 994 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 453 (1892)). 
98. As have many other courts. See, e.g., People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 82 (Cal. 1913); State 
v. Head, 498 S.E.2d 389, 392 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Natland Corp. v. Baker’s Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 
52, 59 (Tex. App. 1993). 
99. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670, 732 P.2d at 994 (quoting Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453). 
100. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 994–95. 
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had not conveyed title to any public trust lands and had given up 
“relatively little” control over the public trust.101 Further, the Court 
explained that the State retained ultimate control because it could revoke 
landowners’ ability to build docks at any time.102 
Because some control had been alienated, however, the Court went on 
to apply the test’s second prong. At least to a limited degree, reasoned 
the Court, allowing construction of private docks promoted public 
interest in the jus publicum.103 Such activity was, after all, consistent 
with a public good articulated in the Shoreline Management Act: 
“recognizing and protecting private property rights consistent with the 
public interest.”104 Additionally, the Court saw no reason to draw a 
distinction between encouraging use of public waters from public docks 
and encouraging the same from private docks.105 Finally, the Court 
observed that there was no impairment of the jus publicum because 
recreational docks were not permitted to block access to public 
beaches.106 In sum, the Court held that though the dock statute 
relinquished some state control over public trust land, the statute mildly 
promoted, or at least did not impair, public interest in the jus publicum. 
Caminiti is a fixture in Washington public trust law and its test allows 
courts to respond to alienations of the jus publicum.107 But Washington’s 
                                                     
101. Id. at 672, 732 P.2d at 995. 
102. Id. at 673, 732 P.2d at 996. 
103. Id. However, a recent court of appeals decision held that while dock building is permissible 
under the public trust doctrine, the doctrine confers no positive right to do so. See Samson v. City of 
Bainbridge Island, 149 Wash. App. 33, 59, 202 P.3d 334, 347 (2009) (“Samson misconstrues the 
public trust doctrine by implying that the doctrine enshrines a right to construct individual, private 
docks, just because a private property owner could use that dock for navigation purposes.”). 
104. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 673, 732 P.2d at 996 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020). 
105. Id. at 674, 732 P.2d at 996. 
106. Id. 
107. See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 683, 696, 169 P.3d 14, 22 (2007) 
(citing Caminiti); State v. Longshore, 141 Wash. 2d 414, 427, 5 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2000) (citing 
Caminiti); Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 699, 958 P.2d 273, 283 (1998) (applying 
test); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 638–39, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987) (citing 
Caminiti); Samson, 149 Wash. App. at 58–60, 202 P.3d at 347–48 (citing Caminiti); Citizens for 
Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 569–72, 103 P.3d 203, 205–06 (2004) 
(applying test); Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 
Wash. App. 441, 451–52, 101 P.3d 891, 896–97 (2004) (applying test). 
Interestingly, however, the Caminiti test has never been affirmatively used to restrain state action. 
Courts have only given teeth to Caminiti’s broad statements about the inalienable public interest in 
public trust lands against private parties, doing so to block takings claims. See Esplanade Properties, 
LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Washington law); Orion, 109 Wash. 
2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062. In Orion, a developer had purchased tidelands intending to dredge and fill 
them. 109 Wash. 2d. at 626, 747 P.2d at 1065. The State later designated the lands as “shorelines of 
statewide significance” and refused to allow the developer to proceed. Id. at 627–29, 747 P.2d at 
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public trust doctrine has not remained dormant since Caminiti. As the 
next Part will show, while later courts have looked mainly to the 
Caminiti test for guidance, they have also gone beyond Caminiti and 
explored principles for deciding non-alienation public trust cases. 
III. NON-ALIENATION PUBLIC TRUST DECISIONS APPLY 
REVIEW BEYOND THE CAMINITI TEST 
The first prong of the Caminiti test asks whether the State has given 
up its right of control over the jus publicum;108 the test is constructed 
such that courts should apply the second prong only if they answer “yes” 
to the first.109 In non-alienation cases—where, by definition, the State 
has not given up jus publicum control—a strict application of the test 
will therefore always end at the first prong. 
It is not clear, however, what this means. Of the three reported 
decisions in which courts considered non-alienation cases, only one 
dismissed a public trust claim based on a negative answer to the 
Caminiti test’s first prong.110 The other two, including one by the 
Washington State Supreme Court, went beyond the test’s strict 
parameters.111 The following will explore those three non-alienation 
cases. 
A. Weden v. San Juan County: The Washington State Supreme Court 
Provides Scrutiny Beyond the Caminiti Test in a Non-Alienation 
Case 
In 1998’s Weden v. San Juan County,112 the Supreme Court of 
Washington tackled a non-alienation public trust case. Weden involved a 
public trust doctrine challenge to a San Juan County ordinance 
prohibiting use of motorized personal watercraft.113 The challengers, a 
                                                     
1066–67. The developer brought a takings claim, but the Court sided with the State, concluding that 
the developer never had a right to fill the land, having purchased it subject to the paramount public 
interest in the jus publicum. Id. at 640–42, 747 P.2d at 1072–73. 
108. Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 670, 732 P.2d at 994. 
109. Id. at 670, 732 P.2d at 994–95. 
110. Citizens, 124 Wash. App. at 575, 103 P.3d at 207–08. 
111. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 699–700, 958 P.2d at 283–84; Wash. State Geoduck, 124 Wash. 
App. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897. 
112. 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (1998). 
113. Id. at 684, 958 P.2d at 276. Personal motorized watercraft are commonly and generically 
known as “jet skis.” Personal Watercraft Coal. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 430 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
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trade association and a group of individuals and businesses, asserted that 
the ban violated their public trust right to navigate.114 They directed the 
Court’s attention to an article by the late University of Washington 
Professor Ralph Johnson for the proposition that the doctrine was “like a 
constitutional principle.”115 
Justice Charles Johnson, writing for the majority, drew heavily from 
Professor Johnson’s article, declaring that “courts review legislation 
under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree of judicial 
scrutiny, as if they were measuring that legislation against constitutional 
protections.”116 Justice Johnson’s grounding for “heightened scrutiny” in 
the “universally recognized need to protect public access to and use of 
such unique resources as navigable waters, beds, and adjacent lands” 
also came from Professor Johnson’s article.117 
Turning to the facts, the Court seemed to agree with the respondents 
that use of motorized personal watercraft is an activity encompassed by 
the jus publicum, but nevertheless held that the San Juan County 
ordinance did not violate the public trust doctrine.118 Because the 
                                                     
114. Brief of Respondents at 51–53, Weden, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (No. 64776-3) 
(“[T]he Ordinance substantially impairs the public interest of all members of the public to use and 
access the navigable waters, which the public trust doctrine encourages and protects . . . .”). 
115. Id. at 52 (quoting Johnson, supra note 38, at 527 n.9). Professor Johnson, in turn, drew this 
conclusion from Caminiti. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 527 n.9 (citing Caminiti for the 
proposition that “the doctrine, like a constitutional principle, constrains the power of the 
legislature”). 
116. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 698, 958 P.2d at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Johnson, supra note 38, at 526–27). 
117. Id. (quoting Johnson, supra note 38, at 525). The theoretical justification for courts’ power 
to override legislative decisions under the public trust doctrine is hotly debated. See supra notes 41–
42. Washington courts have occasionally observed that the public trust doctrine is “partially 
encapsulated” in article XVII, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution, which reserves State 
ownership of “the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state.” Rettkowski v. Dep’t of 
Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (1993); see also Wash. State Geoduck Harvest 
Ass’n v. Wash. State Dept. of Natural Res., 124 Wash. App. 441, 451, 101 P.3d 891, 896 (2004) 
(describing public trust doctrine as “essentially” a constitutional protection). And there is at least 
some support for the argument that the duties imposed by the public trust doctrine spring directly 
from the Washington State Constitution. See Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 162 Wash. 2d 
683, 695, 169 P.3d 14, 21 (2007) (implying that the “duty imposed by the public trust doctrine” is a 
product of courts’ interpretation of article XVII, section 1). The interconnectedness of article XVII, 
section 1 and the public trust doctrine is particularly apparent in the frequency with which courts 
undertake intertwining discussions of the two sources of law. See, e.g., id. at 694–96, 713–14, 169 
P.3d 14, 21–22, 30–31 (both lead opinion and dissent discussing article XVII, section 1 and the 
public trust doctrine together); Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 717, 958 P.2d at 292 (Sanders, J., 
dissenting). 
118. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 699, 958 P.2d at 283 (emphasizing that the jus publicum includes 
“other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to the right of navigation and 
the use of public waters”). 
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ordinance represented a regulation of the jus publicum rather than an 
alienation, the Court’s application of the Caminiti test unsurprisingly 
came up negative—a regulation does not “give up” control.119 
Scrutiny, however, did not end there. The Court appeared to weigh 
the ordinance’s negative consequences on the jus publicum against the 
positive. On the one hand, the ban prohibited a recreational use protected 
by the public trust doctrine, but on the other, it left the county’s waters 
otherwise open to access by the entire public.120 Furthermore, the 
County had made findings that use of motorized personal watercraft was 
“inconsistent with the protection and preservation of the wildlife which 
inhabit the waters and refuges of the County.”121 The Court concluded 
that it would stretch the public trust doctrine too far to protect an activity 
that “actually harms and damages” the jus publicum.122 
In sum, Weden endorses scrutiny beyond the Caminiti test in non-
alienation cases. It also provides some guidance as to factors not 
identified in Caminiti that Washington courts should look to when they 
carry out that review: (1) whether the public trust resource remains open 
to the entire public, and (2) whether the State’s action preserves the jus 
publicum. 
B. Non-Alienation Decisions After Weden Have Applied Still 
Different Kinds of Scrutiny 
Two decisions after Weden, both by Division II of the Washington 
Court of Appeals, have addressed non-alienation cases: Washington 
State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Washington State Department of 
Natural Resources,123 and Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management 
v. State.124 Like Weden, both decisions announced use of a heightened 
scrutiny standard.125 But while the court in Washington State Geoduck 
followed Weden in progressing beyond the first prong of Caminiti, the 
court in Citizens did not. 
In Washington State Geoduck, a group of commercial geoduck 
harvesters argued that the Department of Natural Resources violated the 
                                                     
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 699, 958 P.2d at 283–84. 
121. Id. at 687, 958 P.2d at 277. 
122. Id. at 700, 958 P.2d at 284. 
123. 124 Wash. App. 441, 101 P.3d 891 (2004). 
124. 124 Wash. App. 566, 103 P.3d 203 (2004). 
125. Id. at 570–71, 103 P.3d at 205; Wash. State Geoduck, 124 Wash. App. at 451, 101 P.3d at 
896. 
Stoner post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 10:30 AM 
410 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:391 
 
public trust doctrine by auctioning exclusive geoduck126 harvesting 
rights on public land to the highest bidder.127 Not so, said the court. The 
court explained that while Washington’s public trust doctrine includes a 
public interest in geoducks living in state-owned lands,128 the auction 
practices at issue did not violate the public trust doctrine.129 The court’s 
analysis centered on the Caminiti test. Focusing on the test’s first prong, 
the court discussed how the State retained control over this aspect of the 
public trust by maintaining a variety of safeguards.130 As in Weden, 
however, the court proceeded beyond the first prong and emphasized the 
public good promoted by the public trust regulation at issue. 
Where the Weden Court looked to factors not specifically endorsed in 
Caminiti, the Washington State Geoduck court applied the Caminiti 
test’s second prong. The court concluded that far from substantially 
impairing the public trust, the Department of Natural Resources’ 
regulation of commercial geoduck harvesting promoted sustainable use 
and natural regeneration of the resource.131 Such results bolstered values 
that the public trust doctrine traditionally protects: “recreation, 
commerce, and commercial fishing.”132 
In Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management, several citizens 
groups invoked the public trust doctrine to challenge two laws enacted 
through the initiative process that prohibited various hunting and 
trapping practices.133 In Washington, no court had addressed whether 
hunting is a public trust activity, or whether terrestrial wildlife is a 
public trust resource.134 The court concluded that it did not have to 
                                                     
126. “The Pacific geoduck clam (Panopea abrupta) is the largest intertidal clam in the world, 
weighing up to ten pounds, and reaching life spans of up to 163 years.” Wilber v. State, 187 P.3d 
460, 461 n.1 (Alaska 2008). Geoducks can command high market prices. Alaska Trademark 
Shellfish, LLC v. State, 91 P.3d 953, 954 (Alaska 2004). 
127. Wash. State Geoduck, 124 Wash. App. at 448, 101 P.3d at 895. 
128. Id. at 451, 101 P.3d at 896. 
129. Id. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897. 
130. Id. (noting that no title was conveyed, that the Department of Natural Resources remained 
responsible for appraising shellfish bed resources, that resource bidders were required to provide an 
estimate of the resources they would remove, and that the state had the authority to include in leases 
terms deemed “necessary to protect the interests of the state”). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 568, 103 P.3d 203, 
204 (2004). Initiative 655 made it unlawful to hunt black bear using bait, or to hunt black bear, 
cougar, bobcat, or lynx with dogs. See WASH. REV. CODE § 77.15.245 (2008). Initiative 713 made it 
unlawful to use certain forms of traps to capture mammals for certain purposes. See id. 
§§ 77.15.192–.198. 
134. Citizens, 124 Wash. App. at 570, 103 P.3d at 205. 
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decide the issue, because even if hunting was encompassed by the jus 
publicum the citizens groups’ public trust challenge still failed.135 The 
court undertook a careful and detailed application of the first prong of 
the Caminiti test, examining whether the State had given up control over 
Washington’s terrestrial wildlife.136 Because the laws in question were 
state-mandated restrictions on the public’s right to use a resource, 
explained the court, they could not represent the State “giving up” 
control over Washington’s wildlife, but rather amounted to an 
assumption of greater control.137 In other words, the Caminiti test’s first 
prong blocked the Citizens plaintiff’s suit because no alienation had 
occurred. Unlike the Weden Court or the Washington State Geoduck 
court, the Citizens court did not go farther. 
Citizens did, however, produce an ambitious concurrence by Chief 
Judge Christine Quinn-Brintnall. Judge Quinn-Brintnall was concerned 
that the scrutiny to which Washington courts hold the legislature under 
Caminiti was insufficient to protect the interests of future generations in 
the jus publicum.138 In order to remedy this problem, Judge Quinn-
Brintnall advocated a considerable overhaul of the Caminiti test, arguing 
that an element of “future interest” should be considered, and that courts 
should focus their analysis on the second prong, rather than the first, and 
look to whether a state action would harm the public trust before 
addressing whether the State had relinquished control.139 Finally, Judge 
Quinn-Brintnall argued that no weighing of interests could sufficiently 
represent the enduring nature of the public trust, and that courts should 
strike down any law that would result in “unacceptably high” damage to 
a public trust resource.140 
In sum, Washington courts can be called on to strike down legislation 
that involves state choices concerning how the jus publicum will be 
                                                     
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 573–75, 103 P.3d at 206–08. 
137. Id. at 575, 103 P.3d at 207–08. 
138. Id. at 576–77, 103 P.3d at 208 (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., concurring). 
139. Id. at 577–78, 103 P.3d at 209. The new test that Judge Quinn-Brintnall advocated—as she 
modified it to apply to a law passed by initiative—is as follows: 
[T]o determine whether an initiative complies with the public trust doctrine, we must 
determine: (1) whether the people by initiative have given up the State’s right/duty to control 
the jus publicum and (2) if so, whether this relinquishment (a) promotes the future interests of 
the public in the jus publicum, or (b) substantially impairs the public’s future interest in these 
resources. 
Id. at 577, 103 P.3d at 209. 
140. Id. at 578, 103 P.3d at 209 (“[W]e do not evaluate the merits of the reasons for the action or 
the professed needs of those supporting the use or exhaustion of the resources held in the public 
trust.”). 
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used, rather than the alienation of that land to private parties. It appears 
to remain an open question, however, what courts should do when they 
are so called. In Citizens, the majority’s scrutiny of a non-alienation case 
ended with the first prong of the Caminiti test. But in Weden, 
Washington State Geoduck, and Judge Quinn-Brintnall’s Citizens 
concurrence, it did not. 
A careful reading of Weden and Washington State Geoduck suggests 
that review beyond Caminiti’s first prong might include asking whether 
the state action: (1) left the jus publicum open to the entire public;141 (2) 
had positive effects on the public trust resource at issue;142 (3) had a 
positive impact on the jus publicum that outweighed the negative impact 
on those members of the public whose public trust rights it limited;143 or 
(4) satisfied the elements of the Caminiti test’s second prong by either 
promoting or not substantially impairing the jus publicum.144 
It is not clear from Washington’s non-alienation case law, however, 
which of these concerns, if any, courts are required to address. What is 
clear is that Washington’s non-alienation jurisprudence is meager. The 
few cases detailed in this Part represent the totality of Washington law in 
this area. 
IV. WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE PROVIDES 
STRONG NON-ALIENATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine is well developed,145 and 
Wisconsin’s courts have specifically considered public trust challenges 
where state action does not involve alienation of public trust land. In 
their approach to resolving such cases, Wisconsin courts have attempted 
to strike a balance between flexibility and enforcement of public trust 
values. One Wisconsin appellate court reasoned that “no single public 
interest in the use of navigable waters, though afforded the protection of 
                                                     
141. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 699, 958 P.2d 273, 283–84 (1998). 
142. See id. at 700, 958 P.2d at 284 (implying legislation that prevents activities that “actually 
harm[] and damage[] the waters and wildlife of this state” would generally be upheld under the 
public trust doctrine). 
143. See Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash. 
App. 441, 449, 101 P.3d 891, 895 (2004). 
144. See id. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897. 
145. Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and Submerged 
Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 925 n.116 (2007); accord Sax, 
supra note 10, at 509 (“The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has probably made a more conscientious 
effort to rise above rhetoric and to work out a reasonable meaning for the public trust doctrine than 
have the courts of any other state.”); John Quick, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Wisconsin, 1 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 106 (1994). 
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the public trust doctrine, is absolute. Some public uses must yield if 
other public uses are to exist at all. The uses must be balanced and 
accommodated on a case by case basis.”146 Recognition of this principle 
has led Wisconsin courts to develop a rubric for determining when the 
State may exchange one public purpose for another. 
Wisconsin established principles for striking down unprincipled 
transfers of public trust land to private parties much earlier than 
Washington.147 An 1896 case, Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & 
Improvement Co.,148 like Illinois Central, involved a seemingly corrupt 
giveaway of public trust land to private interests.149 In 1891, one James 
Reynolds obtained a special legislative grant of the lakebeds of two 
lakes, which he was to drain, ostensibly to protect public health.150 In 
fact, Mr. Reynolds had formed a land development corporation and 
transferred his rights in the lakebeds to the corporation so the beds could 
be used for development.151 When a riparian owner challenged the grant, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected claims that it was bound by the 
bald legislative declaration of public purpose, and held that grants of 
public trust land were void when they were made for “private purposes, 
and for the sole benefit of private parties.”152 
The Court refined its analysis in State v. Public Service 
Commission153 to address non-alienation cases. Public Service 
Commission involved a challenge to the legislature’s grant of a small 
portion of Lake Wingra’s bed to the City of Madison.154 The land grant 
was made in order to develop a lakeside public park, and the City of 
Madison planned to dredge and fill approximately four acres (one and 
one-fourth percent) of the lake.155 The proposal’s obvious impacts on the 
jus publicum included, among other things, a reduction of the fish-
producing potential of the lake by 1600 to 2000 pounds per year.156 The 
                                                     
146. State v. Vill. of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). 
147. As detailed above, the Washington judiciary’s first foray into this component of the public 
trust doctrine occurred in 1987. See supra Part II.B. 
148. 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896). 
149. See Sax, supra note 10, at 509 (“Priewe . . . contains the strong implication of legislative 
corruption.”). 
150. Priewe, 67 N.W. at 919, 921. 
151. Id. at 921–22. 
152. Id. at 922. 
153. 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957). 
154. Id. at 72. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
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Court relied on a five-factor inquiry to determine whether the lakebed 
grant was acceptable under the public trust doctrine. Upholding the 
grant, the Court reasoned that: 
1. Public bodies will control the use of the area. 2. The area will 
be devoted to public purposes and open to the public. 3. The 
diminution of lake area will be very small when compared with 
the whole of Lake Wingra. 4. No one of the public uses of the 
lake as a lake will be destroyed or greatly impaired. 5. The 
disappointment of those members of the public who may desire 
to boat, fish or swim in the area to be filled is negligible when 
compared with the greater convenience to be afforded those 
members of the public who use the city park.157 
Later Wisconsin courts have relied on the Public Service Commission 
Court’s analysis in other non-alienation public trust cases. For example, 
the same year it decided Public Service Commission, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court applied the factors to uphold another lakebed grant to the 
City of Madison, upon which the city planned to build a public theater 
and civic center.158 In another case that noted the factors, an appellate 
court upheld a local ordinance setting aside a portion of the lake for 
public water ski exhibitions that had been a tourist attraction in the area 
for some twenty-four years.159 
Wisconsin courts treat these factors as flexible guidelines rather than 
an exclusive checklist.160 And, as Professor Sax noted, if the State were 
to show “that any or all of its five tests are not useful guidelines, but that 
public interest problems are more usefully examined by reference to 
other factors, the court would undoubtedly modify its position.”161 
The Public Service Commission factors have also been picked up 
outside of Wisconsin. In Paepke v. Public Building Commission,162 an 
Illinois Supreme Court decision, a group of homeowners brought suit to 
enjoin the use of a portion of a public park as the site for a school.163 
Noting the Wisconsin factors with approval, the Court refused to enjoin 
                                                     
157. Id. at 73–74. 
158. City of Madison v. State, 83 N.W.2d 674, 675, 678 (Wis. 1957). 
159. State v. Vill. of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). 
160. See City of Madison, 83 N.W.2d at 678 (referring to Public Service Commission factors, but 
also considering whether changed public trust use would improve public’s ability to enjoy “scenic 
beauty” of a resource). 
161. Sax, supra note 10, at 519. 
162. 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970). 
163. Id. at 13. 
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the change in land use.164 The Idaho Supreme Court also referenced the 
Wisconsin factors in developing Idaho’s public trust doctrine, and seems 
to have used them to construct its own standard of review.165 Professor 
Sax praised the factors for their relative clarity in the often opaque 
public trust field.166 
This is not to say, however, that the Wisconsin approach has escaped 
criticism entirely. Some commentators have rankled at the absence of an 
overriding preservation factor,167 and one observed that “[l]ike many 
multi-part balancing tests it could do with an accompanying instruction 
booklet.”168 On the whole, however, the Public Service Commission 
Court’s five factors are held in high regard, both by courts and by 
Professor Sax, the nation’s preeminent public trust scholar. 
V. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A MULTI-
FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR NON-ALIENATION CASES 
The public trust doctrine’s vague nature and expansive possibilities 
have led many commentators to argue for creative expansions of the 
doctrine in areas where they see public need.169 The doctrine’s 
interesting, and possibly shaky, theoretical foundations have been 
another fruitful source of debate.170 This Comment’s goals are more 
modest: to clarify Washington’s public trust doctrine, rather than expand 
or justify it. 
                                                     
164. Id. at 19 (“[W]e believe that standards such as [the Public Service Commission factors] 
might serve as a useful guide for future administrative action.”). 
165. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092–93 
(Idaho 1983) (quoting State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957)). 
166. See Sax, supra note 10, at 517 (asserting that the Wisconsin factors are “as close as judicial 
statement has to a specific enumeration of a set of rules for implementation of the public trust 
doctrine”). 
167. See, e.g., Serena M. Williams, Sustaining Urban Green Spaces: Can Public Parks Be 
Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine?, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 23, 42 (2002); Peter Egan, 
Comment, Applying Public Trust Tests to Congressional Attempts to Close National Park Areas, 25 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 717, 739–40 (1998) (“[A]ny trust area could be destroyed incrementally, 
in small stages.”). 
168. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 
239, 269 (1992) (referring to the test as applied in Paepke). Professor Cohen also noted, however, 
that from an economic perspective, the test contains “no major substantive error” so long as the last 
factor is decisive. Id. 
169. See Huffman, supra note 2, at 4–5 (collecting examples of authors arguing for expansions of 
the public trust doctrine in the environmental arena, as well as in less common directions such as 
regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum and intellectual property). 
170. See id. at 5–6 (collecting articles). 
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The public trust doctrine puts judges in an unusual position—it 
requires them to question legislative policy decisions on substantive 
grounds.171 Washington’s non-alienation cases show that inconsistent 
analysis is predictable in such situations unless courts are informed by a 
well-defined rule.172 This Part presents a multi-factor analysis, inspired 
by Wisconsin’s non-alienation jurisprudence, that would allow 
Washington courts to consistently apply meaningful scrutiny in cases 
that the Caminiti test does not reach. 
A. Judicial Review of State Action Under Washington’s Public Trust 
Doctrine Is Not Limited to the Caminiti Test 
The Caminiti Court directed Washington courts addressing public 
trust claims to ask: “(1) whether the State, by the questioned legislation, 
has given up its right of control over the jus publicum and (2) if so, 
whether by so doing the State (a) has promoted the interests of the public 
in the jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially impaired it.”173 By its 
terms, this test does not provide for further analysis once a court 
concludes that it faces a non-alienation case. Washington judges actually 
faced with non-alienation cases, however, have more often than not 
offered public trust law analysis beyond the non-alienation question.174 
There are two ways to understand this treatment of the test. The first 
is to dismiss courts’ analysis beyond Caminiti as dicta and conclude that 
the State can never violate the public trust doctrine in non-alienation 
cases. This seems to have been the view of the majority in Citizens, 
which concluded that the state regulation at issue maintained public trust 
control, and rejected appellants’ public trust claim on that basis.175 A 
purely outcome-centered review of Washington’s body of non-alienation 
cases points in the same direction: Despite their apparent analysis 
                                                     
171. See State v. Heiskell, 129 Wash. 2d 113, 122, 916 P.2d 366, 370 (1996) (“Ultimately, it is 
not this Court’s function to question the wisdom of a[] [legislative] enactment, unless a 
constitutional impediment is present. We will not inquire into the policies underlying a clear 
legislative enactment.”). Though such scrutiny of legislative policy choices is more usual where 
constitutional protections are involved, the public trust doctrine’s constitutional pedigree is 
debatable in Washington. See supra note 117. 
172. Compare, e.g., Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 575, 
103 P.3d 203, 207–08 (2004) (majority opinion) (offering no scrutiny beyond first prong of 
Caminiti test) with id. at 578, 103 P.3d at 209 (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J. concurring) (arguing that 
public trust doctrine requires courts to strike down any law that would result in “unacceptably high” 
damage to natural resources without considering any public good that the law would accomplish). 
173. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 670, 732 P.2d 989, 994–95 (1987). 
174. See supra Part III. 
175. See supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text. 
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beyond the Caminiti test, Washington courts considering non-alienation 
claims have uniformly held that the State did not violate the public trust 
doctrine.176 A plausible conclusion from this trend is that no matter how 
negatively a state action affects the jus publicum, no public trust 
violation can occur so long as the State maintains control of the trust 
lands. 
A closer look at Caminiti and Washington’s non-alienation cases, 
however, suggests that a different understanding is better: While 
Caminiti sets the rule for alienation cases, the State also has enforceable 
public trust duties in non-alienation cases, and courts must address those 
cases with analysis beyond the Caminiti test. 
The circumstances of Caminiti support such an interpretation. The 
Caminiti petitioners’ public trust suit was based on their argument that 
the State had impermissibly given up control of public trust resources.177 
The Court agreed that it was presented with an alienation case, and 
developed a test that addresses alienation situations.178 Principles of 
judicial minimalism suggest that in so doing, the Court was leaving the 
non-alienation question for later courts to answer.179 
This understanding is consistent with most Washington courts’ 
analyses of non-alienation cases. Neither the Washington State Supreme 
Court in Weden nor the Division II Court of Appeals in Washington 
State Geoduck let the fact that the State had maintained control over jus 
publicum settle the matter. Instead, each court also considered the 
positive effects of the State’s challenged action.180 Chief Judge Quinn-
Brintnall took a related position in her passionate Citizens concurrence, 
arguing that courts should strike down state actions that “unacceptably” 
compromise the jus publicum regardless of whether the action had 
alienated the jus publicum.181 The Citizens majority stands alone in its 
                                                     
176. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 958 P.2d 273 (1998) (holding that San 
Juan County ordinance prohibiting use of motorized personal watercraft did not violate public trust 
doctrine); Citizens, 124 Wash. App. 566, 103 P.3d 203 (2004) (holding that law passed by initiative 
did not violate public trust doctrine by putting restrictions on the hunting and trapping of certain 
wild animals); Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash. 
App. 441, 101 P.3d 891 (2004) (holding that Department of Natural Resources’ auctioning of 
exclusive rights to harvest geoducks on public land did not violate public trust doctrine). 
177. Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 672, 732 P.2d at 995. 
178. See id. (holding that by enacting the statute at issue, the Legislature had given up at least 
some right of control over the jus publicum); supra Part II.B. 
179. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT, at ix–xi (1999) (“A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves many things 
undecided.”). 
180. See supra Part III. 
181. See Citizens, 124 Wash. App. at 575–78, 103 P.3d at 208–09 (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., 
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suggestion that the Caminiti test is the only legal tool a Washington 
public trust plaintiff has.182 
If an alienation of control under Caminiti were the only way in which 
the public trust doctrine could be violated, the doctrine would allow state 
action inimical to public trust values to take place without the 
heightened judicial scrutiny the doctrine demands. A worst-case scenario 
might involve a legislative boondoggle destroying public trust lands with 
little or no public benefit. A lake-draining or shoreline-reclamation 
project that was the pork equivalent of Alaska’s “Bridge to Nowhere,”183 
for example, would pass the Caminiti test because it would not represent 
alienation of state control over public trust resources. Nonetheless, it is 
precisely the type of state action that implicates the principles 
undergirding the public trust doctrine—the “universally recognized need 
to protect public access to and use of such unique resources as navigable 
waters, beds, and adjacent lands.”184 
The Caminiti test is a pillar of Washington’s public trust 
jurisprudence. It ensures that the jus publicum remains in public hands 
unless the State can show that a transfer will not harm the public interest. 
But Caminiti does not represent the totality of Washington’s public trust 
doctrine. Heightened public trust scrutiny is required in non-alienation 
cases as well.185 Washington’s appellate courts, however, have not 
addressed head-on what heightened scrutiny means in those 
circumstances. Consequently, when a non-alienating state action 
                                                     
concurring); supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. Judge Quinn-Brintnall also argued that 
courts should strike down state action that harmed the jus publicum without considering the “merits 
of the reasons for the action or the professed needs of those supporting the use or exhaustion of the 
resources held in the public trust.” Id. at 578, 103 P.3d at 209. Such uncompromising review 
surpasses the level of review proposed in this Comment, but speaks to a judicial recognition that the 
public trust doctrine should not end with the Caminiti test. 
182. The Citizens majority’s failure to progress beyond the alienation question is probably best 
explained by appellants’ decision to argue at length that regulations of hunting and trapping passed 
by initiative were abdications of state control over the jus publicum. See Brief of Appellant at 39–
41, Citizens, 124 Wash. App. 566, 103 P.3d 203 (No. 73739-8); Appellants’ Reply at 4–10, 
Citizens, 124 Wash. App. 566, 103 P.3d 203 (No. 73739-8). 
183. See Shailagh Murray, For a Senate Foe of Pork Barrel Spending, Two Bridges Too Far, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/20/.AR2005102001931.html (recounting controversy over $223 million 
in earmarked federal funding for the “Bridge to Nowhere”—an Alaskan bridge connecting “one 
small town to a tiny island”). 
184. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 698, 958 P.2d 273, 283 (1998). 
185. See id. (announcing “heightened degree of judicial scrutiny” standard in non-alienation 
case); Citizens, 124 Wash. App. at 570–71, 103 P.3d at 205 (same); Wash. State Geoduck Harvest 
Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash. App. 441, 451, 101 P.3d 891, 896 (2004) 
(same). 
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implicates public trust lands or rights, trial courts have little concrete 
guidance. 
B. What Does Public Trust Scrutiny Look Like Beyond Caminiti? 
Wisconsin Suggests an Answer 
Fortunately, Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine jurisprudence points 
the way forward for Washington courts. Compared to Washington’s 
uncertain jurisprudence in this area, Wisconsin courts have been 
paragons of clarity. And while a few other states have comparably robust 
public trust traditions,186 Wisconsin’s jurisprudence not only most 
clearly addresses the non-alienation case problem, it also fits 
comfortably with Washington’s existing jurisprudence.187 
To reprise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s factors for evaluating 
non-alienation cases are: 
(1) Whether public bodies will control the use of the area; 
(2) Whether the area will be devoted to public purposes and 
open to the public; 
(3) Whether the diminution of the public trust resource will be 
very small when compared with the whole of the resource; 
(4) Whether any one of the public uses of the resource will be 
destroyed or greatly impaired; 
(5) Whether the new resource use is of greater public benefit 
than the old.188 
Building from these five factors would allow Washington courts to more 
meaningfully analyze legislation that impacts the public trust but does 
not represent a public trust giveaway. This Section proposes modified 
Wisconsin factors and argues that the proposed factors fit with 
Washington courts’ treatment of non-alienation cases. 
1. Moving From Lake Wingra to Puget Sound: A Proposed 
Adaptation of Wisconsin’s Factors to Washington 
In order to adapt the Wisconsin factors to Washington, this Comment 
proposes two modifications. First, some of the Wisconsin Supreme 
                                                     
186. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1089 
(Idaho 1983) (“Massachusetts, Wisconsin and California are the three states with the wealth of 
authority on the subject.”). 
187. See infra Part V.B.2. 
188. See State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73–74 (Wis. 1957); supra notes 153–157 
and accompanying text. 
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Court’s factors are specifically formulated to analyze state actions that 
diminish lakes. Because the purpose of adopting the Wisconsin factors is 
to provide Washington courts with a broadly applicable analytical rubric, 
this narrow language should be dropped. Second, the first Wisconsin 
factor—involving public control over the public trust—should be 
dispensed with altogether as already adequately protected by Caminiti. 
This Comment does not presume to offer a replacement for the Caminiti 
test, merely a complement to it. That being the case, there is no reason 
for the factors to duplicate what Washington courts are already bound to 
consider. 
With those changes made, a Washington court addressing a public 
trust case would first apply the Caminiti test, asking whether an 
alienation occurred. If it answered in the affirmative, the court would 
proceed to the second prong of the test, and decide whether the 
alienation had promoted, or at least not impaired, the public’s interest in 
the jus publicum. If, however, the court concluded that no alienation had 
taken place, it would consider the following: 
(1) Whether the public trust resource will remain available to the 
entire public; 
(2) Whether, and to what extent, the state action will positively 
or negatively impact the public trust resource; 
(3) Whether any one public trust use will be destroyed or greatly 
impaired; 
(4) The overall positive public impact of the state action. 
The above factors mirror to an extent the principles articulated in the 
second prong of the Caminiti test, but they are more flexible. Where the 
second Caminiti prong unequivocally forbids alienations that impair the 
public’s interest in the jus publicum, the factors allow for a more 
nuanced approach, appropriate for situations where the State has not 
given up public trust control. Where the State has not transferred public 
trust resources to private parties the jus publicum is less likely to be 
compromised, and the State should be allowed more leeway in its 
decisions. 
Wisconsin courts apply their factors in a way that is not unbending or 
exclusive, and Washington courts should use the proposed factors in the 
same way. Rather than being treated “as a check-list, resolving the issue 
in favor of whichever column has the most checks,”189 the factors should 
be regarded as tools for determining the fundamental question of 
whether the State is adequately managing the jus publicum “in trust for 
                                                     
189. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
Stoner post DTP.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 10:30 AM 
2010] WASHINGTON PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 421 
 
the people.”190 Depending on the type and magnitude of public trust 
concerns involved, different factors should weigh more or less heavily. 
Factor three, for example, would weigh much more heavily against a law 
that eliminated fishing (a widespread, traditional public trust use) in 
Puget Sound (a large and significant public trust resource) than it would 
against a law that eliminated water skiing (a less common, though 
recognized, use) on Lake Union (a smaller resource). 
Currently, courts facing non-alienation cases are in the position of 
deciding between an ad hoc public trust analysis,191 the second Caminiti 
prong,192 or a total rejection of further scrutiny.193 Adopting the proposed 
factors would eliminate this confusion and provide Washington courts 
with a structured, flexible, and tested approach to non-alienation cases. 
2. The Proposed Factors Fit Well with Washington Jurisprudence 
and Address Important Public Trust Concerns 
Though Washington’s non-alienation public trust cases are few in 
number, a close reading reveals that Washington courts have already 
considered each of the proposed factors in some form. Furthermore, the 
factors address venerable public trust principles and will improve courts’ 
scrutiny of legislative action in non-alienation cases, while still allowing 
for some flexibility in state decisions about the use of public trust 
resources. The following sections illustrate the factors’ groundings in 
Washington’s public trust jurisprudence and the public trust principles 
they address. 
a. “Whether the public trust resource will remain available to the 
entire public” 
This first factor encourages the State to maintain a public trust 
resource’s public nature even if the resource’s specific use is modified. 
The ongoing public character of public trust resources has long been a 
concern of courts in Washington and elsewhere.194 In Weden, the Court 
remarked with approval that the San Juan County ordinance at issue left 
                                                     
190. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987). 
191. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678, 699–700, 958 P.2d 273, 283–84 (1998). 
192. See Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 124 Wash. 
App. 441, 452, 101 P.3d 891, 897 (2004). 
193. See Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 575, 103 P.3d 
203, 207 (2004). 
194. See supra notes 21, 86–88 and accompanying text. 
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the county’s waters “open to access by the entire public.”195 The 
Caminiti Court also considered this factor, noting that the law it upheld 
did not allow construction of private docks that inhibited public access 
to the jus publicum.196 
b. “Whether, and to what extent, the state action will positively or 
negatively impact the public trust resource” 
This factor speaks to the seemingly self-evident principle—
unaddressed by a Caminiti analysis in non-alienation cases—that the 
continuing existence of public trust resources is a necessary component 
of the public’s interest in them. The Washington State Geoduck court 
recognized that the State has a duty to preserve public trust resources,197 
and the Weden Court suggested that courts will enforce this duty, 
explaining that “it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine to 
sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and 
wildlife of this state.”198 This factor will militate in favor of state actions 
designed to preserve public trust resources, such as the regulations in 
Weden, Washington State Geoduck and Citizens. Conversely, it should 
encourage courts to take a skeptical look at any state action that would 
significantly harm a public trust resource, even if the State retains 
control. 
c. “Whether any one public trust use will be destroyed or greatly 
impaired” 
The third factor recognizes that a core component of the public trust 
doctrine is the public’s right to use public trust resources.199 This 
consideration weighed against the State in Weden, in that the County had 
prohibited a particular public use (operation of motorized personal 
watercraft).200 It might also have weighed against the State in Citizens 
                                                     
195. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 699, 958 P.2d at 283–84. 
196. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 674, 732 P.2d 989, 996 (1987). 
197. Wash. State Geoduck, 124 Wash. App. at 448–49, 101 P.3d at 895 (“[T]he public trust 
doctrine . . . obligates the State to balance the protection of the public’s right to use resources on 
public land with the protection of the resources that enable these activities.”). The Washington State 
Geoduck court also approvingly noted that the Department of Natural Resources’ regulation of 
geoduck harvesting facilitated natural regeneration of the resource. Id. at 452, P.2d at 897. 
198. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 700, 958 P.2d at 284. 
199. See Caminiti, 107 Wash. 2d at 669, 732 P.2d at 994 (recognizing that the “jus publicum 
interest” can be understood as comprising certain rights of use). 
200. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 699, 958 P.2d at 283. 
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had the court found that the initiatives at issue went so far as to “greatly 
impair” Washingtonians’ ability to use a public trust resource. 
d. “The overall positive public impact of the state action” 
The final factor allows courts to consider a state action’s public 
benefit beyond traditional public trust concerns. This factor is 
undoubtedly the one that gives courts the least concrete guidance. Its 
inclusion is nonetheless critical in that it allows for the possibility of 
radical changes to public trust property. Any rule by which courts 
constrain government action under the public trust must be formulated 
such that it does not unalterably trap Washington in a particular 
configuration of policy judgments as to what the public good is.201 It is 
the public trust doctrine’s flexibility that has allowed it to remain vibrant 
despite constant societal change.202 Even in situations where a state’s 
action might eliminate a public trust resource altogether, a showing of 
sufficient public benefit under the fourth factor might allow a court to 
rule in favor of the State,203 though the State would bear a heavy burden. 
CONCLUSION 
The non-alienation test developed by the Washington State Supreme 
Court in Caminiti is too narrow to fully inform court action in all 
situations where the public trust is implicated. Washington courts have 
taken tentative steps in applying the public trust doctrine where the State 
has not given up control over the jus publicum, but they need to be more 
explicit about what they are doing. Clearer law in this area would help 
courts, legislators, and agencies more accurately evaluate the constraints 
the public trust doctrine puts on state action. Wisconsin’s well-
developed public trust law supplies a formula that both comports with 
Washington’s muddy jurisprudence, and is also “as close as judicial 
statement has to a specific enumeration of a set of rules for 
implementation of the public trust doctrine.”204 Washington should 
follow Wisconsin’s lead. 
                                                     
201. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text; cf. Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 
640–41, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (“Recognizing modern science’s ability to identify the public 
need, state courts have extended the doctrine beyond its navigational aspects.”). 
203. Though critical of the Wisconsin factors for their vagueness, Professor Cohen suggested that 
the test is most charitably understood, and most substantively correct, when the final factor is 
“decisive.” See Cohen, supra note 168, at 269. 
204. See Sax, supra note 10, at 517. 
